Fast spreading network worms have become one of the most service-impacting threats in enterprise and ISP networks. We identify core requirements for effective detection and containment ofsuch worms and propose a technique that uses a combination of distributed anomaly-based host intrusion detection and statistical analysis of network heuristics to detect malicious worm activity. Our proposal employs an automated collaborative network-centric worm containment approach. We experiment on a live test-bed with fast spreading worms and evaluate the effectiveness ofour method in detecting and containing such worms. We also evaluate the system's performance when malicious worm traffic blends with benign network scanning traffic. on where the anomalous behavior is to be detected. Anomalybased network intrusion detection techniques infer malicious activity in a network by detecting anomalous network traffic patterns [5, 6] . While these techniques can effectively detect fast spreading worms under favorable conditions, they cannot reliably detect worm propagation that do not cause anomalous traffic patterns [4, 7] . Nonetheless, recent papers [8, 2] and vendor implementations [9] have recorded success in using anomaly-based host intrusion detection (AHID) techniques for detection of unauthorized intrusions. AHID systems are capable of leveraging large amounts of detailed context about applications and system behavior to effectively detect anomalous host behaviors [3] . It has been suggested that since end hosts running vulnerable software are the targets of malicious code attacks, they ought to be the point of detection [8] . The technique adopted in [8] shows that with properly instrumented detection software, host-based intrusion detection is effective and capable of eliminating false positives.
II. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Techniques for detecting malicious intrusions can be divided into two broad groups: Signature-based techniques and anomaly-based techniques. Signature-based techniques in general require a managed database of unique malicious code signatures and are only capable of detecting malicious packets with known signatures [1] . Zero-day attacks due to malicious traffic with unknown signatures cannot be detected by such techniques. Similarly, intrusion containment systems that depend on signature-based detection schemes are largely ineffective in containing zero-day attacks. In fact, well-known techniques for evading signature detection exist [2, 3, 4] . Anomaly-based intrusion detection systems (AIDS) can be classified as network AIDS or host AIDS depending tThis research was partially funded by grants from Natural Sciences and
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1-4244-1513-06/07/$25.00 @2007 IEEE on where the anomalous behavior is to be detected. Anomalybased network intrusion detection techniques infer malicious activity in a network by detecting anomalous network traffic patterns [5, 6] . While these techniques can effectively detect fast spreading worms under favorable conditions, they cannot reliably detect worm propagation that do not cause anomalous traffic patterns [4, 7] . Nonetheless, recent papers [8, 2] and vendor implementations [9] have recorded success in using anomaly-based host intrusion detection (AHID) techniques for detection of unauthorized intrusions. AHID systems are capable of leveraging large amounts of detailed context about applications and system behavior to effectively detect anomalous host behaviors [3] . It has been suggested that since end hosts running vulnerable software are the targets of malicious code attacks, they ought to be the point of detection [8] . The technique adopted in [8] shows that with properly instrumented detection software, host-based intrusion detection is effective and capable of eliminating false positives.
In this paper, we propose a technique that uses host-based intrusion detection to achieve intrusion containment in the network. There is ample evidence of the effectiveness of host-based anomaly detection techniques in detecting host intrusions and anomalous behaviour with minimal false alarms [8] . Our technique is unique because it leverages the benefits of host-based detection to achieve distributed collaborative network intrusion containment of fast spreading worms and malicious code with zero false positives and false negatives.
Contributions of this work are:
. We propose requirements for effective intrusion detection and collaborative containment. A. Requirements for effective intrusion detection and containment 1) Verifiable detection of malicious intrusions: An effective detection technique should include detection of actual malicious intrusion attempts or observation of verifiable intrusion as a basis for confirming the existence of malicious activity. Dependence on network traffic heuristics alone for detection either on a host network interface or on network routers does not offer guarantees on the rate of false positives and false negatives [8, 16] .
2) Collaborative network-based containment: A containment technique that ensures fast propagation of the containment action is required. Ideally, such a technique should propagate containment at a rate superior to the propagation rate of network worms. While network-based techniques protect a fraction of the target population when executed, hostbased techniques protect only a single host at a time. Clearly, for fast containment, network-based techniques should be deployed. Further, a collaborative containment architecture should be used to suppress large scale worm attacks [11, 12] . Authors in those papers experimented with the concept of collaborative cellular containment where the network is broken into logical cells, each with in-built containment capabilities. Their results show that such a distributed and cooperative approach greatly improves containment systems.
3) Automated rapid response: Response to worm invasion must be automated and fast to be effective. An effective response should involve minimal overhead and processing time between intrusion detection and containment execution.
B. Merits of our approach
The technique proposed in this paper combines the significant benefits of host-based anomaly detection with statistical correlation of network heuristics to determine an intrusion traffic flow. It employs a distributed network-centric containment approach to rapidly contain the intrusion traffic. The first merit of our technique stems from its ability to accurately detect unauthorized intrusions due to both known and unknown malicious code which tamper with vulnerable endpoints. Intrusion alerts are generated only when verifiable malicious intrusion traffic is detected. Occurrence of false alarms is therefore eliminated since the technique responds only to verifiable intrusions and not to benign intrusion attempts which occur quite frequently on enterprise networks and on the Internet. The second merit is that the containment action is network-centric. This makes the technique feasible in real world scenarios where containment actions are typically carried out at layer-3 boundaries thus protecting a fraction of the vulnerable population with a single containment action. Also, our reactive containment technique generates a router filter against ingress malicious intrusion traffic that match the detected attacker's profile. The profile is a 3-tuple consisting of the attacker's source IP address, the target port, and the transport layer protocol used. This reactive blocking ensures that access to the vulnerable service by only the attacker's IP address is blocked. Other legitimate users of the services continue to have access to the services. Third, the technique lends itself to distributed and collaborative containment. This merit is also enjoyed by the pushback technique [15] where containment action is initiated from within a logical zone in a network and spreads out into the larger enterprise network. Finally, due to the responsiveness of our technique which ensures rapid containment of detected intrusion traffic, it is capable of significantly reducing the spread of fast propagating worms before core and distribution gigabit links in enterprise and ISP networks become congested. Our technique can therefore be effective in combatting DoS attacks due to malicious fast spreading worms.
C. Outline of the paper Section III of this paper describes details of the proposed detection technique and algorithms used for iterative analysis of network heuristics and intelligent containment of intrusion traffic. Section IV and V contain experimental analysis and discussions of the technique and its performance. We conclude this paper in section VI with a brief summary and an outline of ideas and possible extensions for future work.
III. AUTOMATED INTRUSION DETECTION AND COLLABORATIVE CONTAINMENT
The proposed technique is divided into three sub-tasks: i) Detection of intrusion ii) statistical determination of intrusion traffic and iii) containment of intrusion and its propagation.
A. Detection ofIntrusion
We propose a distributed intrusion detection strategy which uses our instrumented anomaly host-based detector agent (DA) software running on designated strategically located detector endpoints (DEs) within an enterprise network for hostbased detection. In large enterprise networks, a number of independently functional DEs can be located within distributed subnets or cells to detect and respond to intrusion attempts on the subnet. This distributed detection enjoys the benefit of operating close to the point of infection or intrusion. The DA running on a DE performs continuous real-time recording of the profile of all network traffic destined to the DE and originated from outside its subnet. We define a profile as a 3-tuple consisting of srcIP, dstport, proto. srcIP is the source IP address in the IP header of packets captured by the DE, dstport is the target port and proto is the transport layer protocol used. When a verifiable unauthorized intrusion is detected by a DA it responds by notifying the upstream gateway router (GR) of the intrusion and triggering a transfer of its record to the router over an encrypted channel. In our experiments, we used port 9090 UDP to emulate a vulnerable service running on the DEs and malicious intrusion detection was verified only when an attacker establishes a connection to the vulnerable service. DEs do not initiate communication with any host outside their cell. Traffic hits on the DEs from outside their cell must therefore be as a result of benign network scans or verifiable malicious intrusions. A minimum of two DEs are required in each logical cell to facilitate our correlation algorithm on the GR.
B. Iterative statistical determination of intrusion traffic
A process running on the upstream GR monitors the transfer of records from DEs within a target subnet. When the GR receives the first record from a DE in the subnet it immediately establishes other secure sessions with the remaining DE(s) in that subnet and retrieves their records. A correlation algorithm triggered on the gateway router performs an iterative statistical analysis on all the records to determine the profile of the most likely intrusion traffic. We use a number of states to describe the correlation algorithm. represents the probability that a particular profile xi occurs in the record. The event Y for a particular record can be represented as:
Y {xi: xi is a profile in the record} (1) 2) Normalization: In this state the algorithm uses Z-score normalization to standardize the set of probabilities on a common scale. Z-score for px (xi) is defined as: In this state the algorithm generates event H such that the outcomes in H are a selection of the outcomes in C with probabilities that have a Z-score greater than a chosen threshold @ where 0 < K < oc. The outcomes of event H are considered suspicious due to the degree of statistical deviation of the frequency of their occurrences from the mean and are therefore selected for further analysis. 1 is a configurable parameter on the GR. The event H can be represented as:
The algorithm iteratively determines the intrusion traffic using the 
It is our assumption in the Comparison state that during a worm invasion there is a high probability that DEs located in a cell under attack will experience early intrusion attempts and therefore will record profiles of the intrusion traffic. Previous work reveal that several recent scanning worms such as Code RED II [13] and Nimda [14] preferentially target other hosts from IP address ranges closer to the vulnerable target host (i.e. in the same /24 or /16 network). Our assumption will fail only if the attacker has prior knowledge of the DEs and instruments a worm that selectively avoids malicious intrusion attempts on the DEs. We also assume that while nonexistence of common outcomes across the Yi events suggests non-occurrence of worm activity, the concurrent occurrence of a common outcome and a detected verifable malicious intrusion attempt is a strong indication of worm activity. The selection and iteration process is used to progressively and statistically analyze the records from the DEs until the profile that corresponds to the common outcome with the greatest relative frequency of occurrences is determined if one exists. The correlation algorithm assumes that such a profile is associated with the malicious intrusion traffic and triggers a containment action.
C. Containment of intrusion
Our technique executes containment of malicious intrusion traffic by automatically applying router filters on the GR to block the profile associated with the inbound malicious intrusion traffic as determined by our correlation algorithm. The filter is applied against the 3-tuple consisting of the IP address of the attacker, the target vulnerable port and the transport protocol used. This filter ensures that inbound access to the vulnerable target service by the attacker's IP address is blocked. While authors in [10] affirm that content filtering containment techniques are generally more effective than address blocking techniques, simulation results in [10] show that if reaction time can be minimized, address blocking techniques can be more effective. Our approach uses a rapid reactive blocking technique that meets the timing conditions for effective worm containment [10] . We propose a distributed collaborative containment strategy in which the GR communicates its recent worm containment action along with the 3-tuple profile of the blocked malicious intrusion traffic to peer gateway routers (see Fig. 1 ). In Fig. 1 , Cell-i represents the subnet under direct attack and GR-1 is the gateway router for cell-i. After executing a reactive block against the attacker's profile, GR-1 notifies its peer GRs (GR-2, GR-3 and GR-8).
A reactive blocking protocol running on the peer gateway routers determines how the routers handle the notification. The reactive blocking protocol was designed to immediately block the malicious intrusion traffic after receiving the notification and then monitor the suspected vulnerable target port for existence of worm activity. If the protocol determines that worm activity is not prevalent it disables the block thereby preventing a potential denial of service. We use a number of states to describe the reactive blocking protocol.
1) Reactive blocking: The protocol starts by creating a router filter on a peer GR that blocks the profile associated with the malicious intrusion traffic. The filter blocks ingress traffic that match the profile from entering all cells or subnets existing on the peer GR.
2) Monitoring: In this state, with the filter still applied, the peer GR carries out real-time monitoring and recording of the number of hits on the filter for a y-second interval to verify actual existence of the suspected worm activity. After y seconds the algorithm computes a probing rate where: number of hits on filter probing rate = (6) Fig. 1 ). In this state the filter is removed to prevent a denial of service on legitimate traffic. Both y and w are configurable parameters of the protocol. Fast spreading worms are known to exhibit probing rates in the order of tens of thousands probes/second. It is our assumption that in an event of a fast spreading worm invasion the reactive blocking protocol on peer GRs will reach Notification state if y and w parameters are properly chosen. In that scenario, all enterprise gateway routers quickly get to be aware of the attacker's profile and establish filters against ingress traffic that match the attacker's profile thus achieving enterprise-wide fast and automated containment.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND ANALYSIS
To evaluate the functionality and performance of our proposed technique, we emulated self propagating worm invasion attacks using a modified blaster worm code which attempts to randomly establish socket connections on UDP port 9090 with a pre-generated list of vulnerable hosts (Host-Al, Host-A2, DE-1, DE-2) in the target subnet A (see Fig. 2 ). Vulnerable hosts were emulated using endpoints running a hypothetically vulnerable UDP service on port 9090. They are considered infected when they accept connections from our instrumented worm code and a file named intrusion is copied into their /root/ directory. We measured average infection rates of upto 70 hosts per second (h/s) using a single instance of our instrumented worm. In comparison, the code red worm [13] infected 359000 hosts in less than 14 hours, equivalent to an average infection rate in the order of 7.lh/s while the Witty worm [17] infected 110 hosts in the first 10 seconds, equivalent to an average infection rate of about 1 lh/s. When hosts within the target subnet are infected by the attacking host, they in turn propagate the worm by also attempting to establish connections with hosts outside the target subnet. In our experiment we chose to limit worm propagation from infected hosts in subnet A to destinations outside of subnet A in order to eliminate the possibility of having the DEs erroneously respond to attacks originating from within their cell.
In the experiments we varied the infection rate of our emulated worm between th/s and 35h/s and observed the performance of our proposed detection and containment technique. Fig. 2 shows the layout of our live experimental test-bed. We used only two detector endpoints (DE-1 and DE-2) and two vulnerable hosts (Host-Al and Host-A2) in the target network (subnet A) to simplify demonstration of the technique and result analysis. GR-1 is the gateway router for subnet A while GR-2 and GR-3 are the gateway routers for subnet B and subnet C respectively. All gateway routers ran our correlation algorithm and reactive blocking protocol. After GR-1 executes a containment block, it notifies GR-2 and GR-3 and they too execute similar blocks following the reactive blocking protocol. The gateway routers, detector endpoints and vulnerable hosts were implemented on Linux systems running kernel 2.4 with 733Mhz Intel processors and 256MB RAM.
A. Experiment 1: Worm attack without background traffic
In this experiment the attacking host was used to launch direct attacks on the four hosts in subnet A (Host-Al, Host-A2, DE-1, DE-2) selecting each one randomly. Our detector agents (DAs) ran on DE-1 and DE-2 and re-initialized DE records in 20-second intervals. After infection, Host-Al and Host-A2 attempt to propagate the worm code by continuously attempting socket connections on UDP port 9090 with Host-B1 and Host-B12 in subnet B and Host-Cl and Host-C2 in subnet C. This emulates worm propagation. The objectives in this experiment were to: i) Evaluate the responsiveness of our proposed technique in protecting a target network from unauthorized worm intrusions. ii) Evaluate effectiveness of the technique in containing spread of network worms, hence protecting other vulnerable hosts and services that reside outside the initial target network. The following system performance metrics were measured: 1) Containment interval T: computed as the time interval between detecting the worm intrusion traffic on a DE and the establishment of a containment block against the attacking host on the gateway router.
2) Rate offalse negatives: computed as the fraction of total number of experimental runs performed that did not result in a containment action even in the presence of malicious worm activity.
To improve statistical significance of our results, 100 attack instances were carried out for each infection rate level used in the experiment. The average containment interval and rate of false negatives were recorded. Parameters used in the correlation algorithm were: @ = 0.05, 6 = 0.05. These values determine the number of iterations performed by the correlation algorithm before the intrusion traffic profile is de- . Fig. 3 show that the measured average containment interval on GR-1 remained nearly steady at a mean value of 3.4s with a variance of 0.03s2 as we varied the infection rate of our instrumented worm. Similarly GR-2 and GR-3 recorded mean containment interval values of 4.33s and 4.39s respectively with variances of 0.042s2 and 0.045s2 respectively.
The results suggest that containment interval on the gateway routers is largely independent of worm propagation speed or infection rate but is primarily determined by the operations of the detection algorithm and containment technique. The results also suggest that our approach to collaborative containment is capable of containing fast spreading worms within five seconds of detection. In comparison, recent simulations by Moore et al suggest that an effective worm containment should require a reaction time of well under sixty seconds [10] . While worm infections in an enterprise network will not be completely prevented by our technique during a worm outbreak, the results suggest our technique is capable of protecting a proportion of vulnerable hosts in any enterprise or global network during a zero-day fast spreading worm invasion. Factors that determine the size of the protected portion of enterprise hosts include worm propagation speed and deployment strategy of the technique. Network placement of GRs and choice of configuration parameters for the both DEs and GRs are crucial to rapid collaborative containment in an enterprise network. Fig. 4 However, for infection rates less than this we observed nonzero rates of false negatives. For our correlation algorithm to determine the offending traffic profile during worm activity, the active DEs in the target subnet must simultaneously have record of the worm's traffic profile. Fig. 5 , Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 show snapshots of DE records for experiments with infection rates of 25h/s, lOhIs and 0.5h/s respectively. It can be observed in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 that for 25h/s and lOhIs infection rates, both DE-1 and DE-2 simultaneously have entries of the worm traffic profile for all captured snapshots. This results inl zero false ilegatives (see Fig. 4 ). Fur O.5hIs inifectionl rate (Fig. 7) , we observe that worm attacks do not spread fast enough to register simultaneous records on both DE-1 and DE-2 in a number of instances. This results in higher rates of false negatives. The detection and correlation algorithm proposed in this paper is however optimized for detection offast spreading worms. We leave detection of stealthy and slowlypropagating worms for future work.
B. Experiment 2: Worm attack with background network scanning traffic
In this experiment, the same experimental conditions used in experiment 1 were maintained, with the addition of continuous background network scanning traffic. The network scanning traffic stream was generated using a UDP socket application attempting connections to port 1234 on the four hosts in subnet A (Host-Al, Host-A2, DE-1, DE-2). See Fig. 2 . The traffic is benign since it does not attack the vulnerable service on port 9090 UDP. The packet transmission rate of the scans was therefore kept constant at two packets per second. The objective of the experiment was to assess the impact of such network scans on the accuracy of our detection and correlation technique. We measured the rate of false positives exhibited by our technique when worm traffic blended with the network scans. Rate of false positives was computed as the fraction of total number of experimental runs that triggered a containment action against a traffic profile that did not belong to the attacking worm. Results in Fig. 8 show that for infection rates greater than 3h/s, our algorithms were accurate in determining the attacker's profile exhibiting 0% rate of false positives. Using detection of verifiable malicious intrusions as trigger for our algorithm plays a vital role in ensuring zero false positives alerts for fast spreading worms. For stealthy worms with infection rates less than 2h/s, the results show non-zero rates of false positives. In this region, worm traffic is indistinguishable from the scanning traffic, and exhibits in a number of instances, lower frequency of occurrence in DE records compared to the scanning traffic (Fig. 9) . It therefore evades our correlation algorithm even though verifiable intrusions due to the worm traffic were detected by the DEs. Essentially, when worm traffic blends with network scans, our technique will record non-zero false positives only if probing rate of network scans constantly exceeds the probing rate of fast spreading worm traffic on the target cell.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we outlined crucial requirements for effective detection and containment of fast spreading malicious worms and proposed a distributed collaborative containment technique which relies on distributed host-based anomaly detector endpoints for notification. We identified gaps between existing proposals for detection and containment of such worms and our proposed solution. Experimenting on a live test-bed, our results revealed that the technique is capable of containing fast spreading zero-day worms withinfive seconds of detecting the attack with zero false positives and false negatives. The results also show that in the presence of benign network scans, fast spreading malicious worms can be accurately detected.
For future work, we intend to carry out further analysis of our distributed host-based intrusion detection and network centric containment technique for combatting fast spreading worms. This involves developing analytical models to quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of the technique in slowing down worm propagation as well as protecting a vulnerable population during a worm invasion. We would also like to extend our host-based intrusion detection and networkcentric collaborative containment technique to DDoS attacks that may not necessarily be caused by infectious worms.
